Efficient Decision-based Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Face
  Recognition by Dong, Yinpeng et al.
Efficient Decision-based Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Face Recognition
Yinpeng Dong1, Hang Su1, Baoyuan Wu2, Zhifeng Li2, Wei Liu2, Tong Zhang3, Jun Zhu1∗
1 Dept. of Comp. Sci. and Tech., BNRist Center, State Key Lab for Intell. Tech. & Sys.,
1 Institute for AI, THBI Lab, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China
2 Tencent AI Lab 3 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
dyp17@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn, suhangss@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn, wubaoyuan1987@gmail.com
michaelzfli@tencent.com, wl2223@columbia.edu, tongzhang@tongzhang-ml.org, dcszj@mail.tsinghua.edu.cn
Abstract
Face recognition has obtained remarkable progress in
recent years due to the great improvement of deep convo-
lutional neural networks (CNNs). However, deep CNNs are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can cause fateful
consequences in real-world face recognition applications
with security-sensitive purposes. Adversarial attacks are
widely studied as they can identify the vulnerability of the
models before they are deployed. In this paper, we evaluate
the robustness of state-of-the-art face recognition models in
the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the at-
tackers have no access to the model parameters and gradi-
ents, but can only acquire hard-label predictions by sending
queries to the target model. This attack setting is more prac-
tical in real-world face recognition systems. To improve the
efficiency of previous methods, we propose an evolutionary
attack algorithm, which can model the local geometries of
the search directions and reduce the dimension of the search
space. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed method that induces a minimum perturba-
tion to an input face image with fewer queries. We also ap-
ply the proposed method to attack a real-world face recog-
nition system successfully.
1. Introduction
Recent progress in deep convolutional neural networks
(CNNs) [29, 32, 11] has led to substantial performance im-
provements in a broad range of computer vision tasks. Face
recognition, as one of the most important computer vision
tasks, has been greatly facilitated by deep CNNs [26, 39, 17,
37, 5, 38, 36]. There are usually two sub-tasks in face recog-
nition: face verification and face identification [12, 16]. The
former distinguishes whether a pair of face images repre-
sent the same identity, while the latter classifies an image
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Figure 1. Demonstration of the decision-based black-box attack
setting. Given a black-box model, the attackers use queries to gen-
erate adversarial examples with minimum perturbations.
to an identity. The state-of-the-art face recognition models
realize these two tasks by using deep CNNs to extract face
features that have minimum intra-class variance and maxi-
mum inter-class variance. Due to the excellent performance
of these models, face recognition has been widely used for
identity authentication in enormous applications, such as fi-
nance/payment, public access, criminal identification, etc.
Despite the great success in various applications, deep
CNNs are known to be vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples [34, 9, 21, 6]. These maliciously generated adversarial
examples are often indistinguishable from legitimate ones
for human observers by adding small perturbations. But
they can make deep models produce incorrect predictions.
The face recognition systems based on deep CNNs have
also been shown their vulnerability against such adversar-
ial examples. For instance, adversarial perturbations can
be made to the eyeglass that, when worn, allows attackers
to evade being recognized or impersonate another individ-
ual [27, 28]. The insecurity of face recognition systems in
real-world applications, especially those with sensitive pur-
poses, can cause severe consequences and security issues.
To evaluate the robustness of face recognition systems in
real-world applications, adversarial attacks can serve as an
important surrogate, as they can identify the vulnerability of
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these systems [2] and help improve the robustness [9, 20].
However, existing attack methods [27, 28] for face recog-
nition are mainly based on the white-box scenario, where
the attackers know the internal structure and parameters of
the system being attacked. Accordingly, the attack objective
function can be directly optimized by gradient-based meth-
ods. This setting is clearly impractical in real-world cases,
when the attackers cannot get access to the model details.
Instead, we focus on a more realistic and general decision-
based black-box setting [1], where no model information
is exposed except that the attackers can only query the tar-
get model and obtain corresponding hard-label predictions.
The goal of attacks is to generate adversarial examples with
minimum perturbations by limited queries. This attack sce-
nario is much more challenging, since the gradient cannot
be directly computed and the predicted probability is not
provided. On the other hand, it is much more realistic and
important, because most of the real-world face recognition
systems are black-box and only provide hard-label outputs.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to con-
duct adversarial attacks on face recognition in this setting.
Several methods [1, 15, 4] have been proposed to per-
form decision-based black-box attacks. However, they lack
the efficiency in the sense that they usually require a tremen-
dous number of queries to converge, or get a relatively large
perturbation given a limited budget of queries. Therefore,
we consider how to efficiently generate adversarial exam-
ples for decision-based black-box attacks by inducing a
smaller perturbation to each sample with fewer queries.
To address the aforementioned issues, we propose an
evolutionary attack method for query-efficient adversar-
ial attacks in the decision-based black-box setting. Given
the attack objective function, the proposed method can opti-
mize it in the black-box manner through queries solely. Our
method can find better search directions by modeling their
local geometries. It further improves the efficiency by re-
ducing the dimension of the search space. We apply the pro-
posed method to comprehensively study the robustness of
several state-of-the-art face recognition models, including
SphereFace [17], CosFace [37], and ArcFace [5], under the
decision-based black-box scenario. Extensive experiments
conducted on the most popular public-domain face recogni-
tion datasets such as Labeled Face in the Wild (LFW) [12]
and MegaFace Challenge [16] demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed method. We further apply our method to at-
tack a real-world face recognition system to show its practi-
cal applicability. In summary, our major contributions are:
• We propose a novel evolutionary attack method un-
der the decision-based black-box scenario, which can
model the local geometries of the search directions and
meanwhile reduce the dimension of the search space.
The evolutionary attack method is generally applica-
ble for any image recognition task, and significantly
improves the efficiency over existing methods.
• We thoroughly evaluate the robustness of several state-
of-the-art face recognition models by decision-based
black-box attacks in various settings. We demonstrate
the vulnerability of these face models in this setting.
• We show the practical applicability of the proposed
method by successfully attacking a real-world face
recognition system.
2. Related Work
Deep face recognition. DeepFace [35] and DeepID [31]
treat face recognition as a multi-class classification prob-
lem and use deep CNNs to learn features supervised by the
softmax loss. Triplet loss [26] and center loss [39] are pro-
posed to increase the Euclidean margin in the feature space
between classes. The angular softmax loss is proposed in
SphereFace [17] to learn angularly discriminative features.
CosFace [37] uses the large margin cosine loss to maximize
the cosine margin. The additive angular margin loss is pro-
posed in ArcFace [5] to learn highly discriminative features.
Adversarial attacks on face recognition. Deep CNNs
are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples [34, 9, 21].
Face recognition has also been shown the vulnerability
against attacks. In [27], the perturbations are constrained to
the eyeglass region and generated by gradient-based meth-
ods, which fool face recognition systems even in the physi-
cal world. The adversarial eyeglasses can also be produced
by generative networks [28]. However, these methods rely
on the white-box manipulations of face recognition models,
which is unrealistic in real-world applications. Instead, we
focus on evaluating the robustness of face recognition mod-
els in the decision-based black-box attack setting.
Black-box attacks. Black-box attacks can be divided
into transfer-based, score-based, and decision-based at-
tacks. Transfer-based attacks generate adversarial exam-
ples for a white-box model and attack the black-box model
based on the transferability [18, 6]. In score-based attacks,
the predicted probability is given by the model. Several
methods rely on approximated gradients to generate adver-
sarial examples [3, 15]. In decision-based attacks, we can
only obtain the hard-label predictions. The boundary attack
method is based on random walks on the decision bound-
ary [1]. The optimization-based method [4] formulates this
problem as a continuous optimization problem and esti-
mates the gradient for optimization. However, it needs to
calculate the distance to the decision boundary along a di-
rection by binary search. In [15], the predicted probability is
estimated by hard-label predictions. Then, the natural evo-
lution strategy (NES) is used to maximize the target class
probability or minimize the true class probability. These
methods generally require a large number of queries to gen-
erate an adversarial example with a minimum perturbation,
or converge to a large perturbation with few queries .
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3. Methodology
In this section, we first introduce the decision-based
black-box attack setting against a face recognition model,
and then detail the proposed evolutionary attack method.
3.1. Attack Setting
Let f(x) : X → Y (X ⊂ Rn) denote the face recogni-
tion model that predicts a label for an input face image. For
face verification, the model relies on another face image to
identify whether the pair of images belong to the same iden-
tity, and outputs a binary label in Y = {0, 1}. For face
identification, the model f(x) compares the input image x
with a gallery set of face images, and then classifies x as a
specific identity. So it can be viewed as a multi-class clas-
sification task, where Y = {1, 2, ...,K}, with K being the
number of identities. Although the face recognition model
f(x) uses an additional face image or a set of face images
for recognizing x, we do not explicitly describe the depen-
dency of f(x) on the compared images for simplicity.
Given a real face image x, the goal of attacks is to gen-
erate an adversarial face image x∗ in the vicinity of x but is
misclassified by the model. It can be obtained by solving a
constrained optimization problem
min
x∗
D(x∗,x), s.t. C(f(x∗)) = 1, (1)
where D(·, ·) is a distance metric, and C(·) is an adversar-
ial criterion that takes 1 if the attack requirement is satisfied
and 0 otherwise. We use the L2 distance as D. The con-
strained problem in Eq. (1) can be equivalently reformu-
lated as the following unconstrained optimization problem
min
x∗
L(x∗) = D(x∗,x) + δ(C(f(x∗)) = 1), (2)
where δ(a) = 0 if a is true, otherwise δ(a) = +∞. By opti-
mizing Eq. (2), we can obtain an image x∗ with a minimum
perturbation, which is also adversarial according to the cri-
terion. Note that in the above objective functions, C cannot
be defined as a continuous criterion such as cross-entropy
loss, since the model f(x) only gives discrete hard-label
outputs in this problem. In particular, we specify C accord-
ing to the following two types of attacks.
Dodging attack corresponds to generating an adversarial
image that is recognized wrong or not recognized. Dodg-
ing attack could be used to protect personal privacy against
excessive surveillance. For face verification, given a pair
of face images belonging to the same identity, the attacker
seeks to modify one image and makes the model recog-
nize them as not the same identity. So the criterion is
C(f(x∗)) = I(f(x∗) = 0), where I is the indicator func-
tion. For face identification, the attacker generates an ad-
versarial face image with the purpose that it is recognized as
any other identity. The criterion is C(f(x∗)) = I(f(x∗) 6=
y), where y is the true identity of the real image x.
Impersonation attack works as seeking an adversarial
image recognized as a specific identity, which could be used
to evade the face authentication systems. For face verifica-
tion, the attacker tries to find an adversarial image that is
recognized as the same identity of another image, while the
original images are not from the same identity. The crite-
rion is C(f(x∗)) = I(f(x∗) = 1). For face identification,
the generated adversarial image needs to be classified as a
specific identity y∗, so C(f(x∗)) = I(f(x∗) = y∗).
3.2. Evolutionary Attack
Since we cannot get access to the configuration and pa-
rameters of f(x) but can only send queries to probe the
model, we resort to black-box optimization techniques to
minimize the objective function in Eq. (2). Gradient estima-
tion methods [22, 8, 7] approximate the gradient of the ob-
jective function by finite difference and update the solution
by gradient descent, which are commonly used for score-
based black-box attacks, when the predicted probability is
given by the model [3, 15]. However, in the case of hard-
label output, the attack objective function is discontinuous
and the output is insensitive to small input perturbations.
So the gradient estimation methods cannot be directly used.
Some methods [4, 15] successfully reformulate the discon-
tinuous optimization problem in Eq. (2) as some continuous
optimization problems and use gradient estimation methods
for optimization. But they need to calculate the distance of
a point to the decision boundary or estimate the predicted
probability by the hard-label outputs, which are less effi-
cient as demonstrated in the experiments. Therefore, we
consider how to directly optimize Eq. (2) efficiently.
In this paper, we propose a novel evolutionary attack
method to solve the black-box optimization problem. Our
method is based on a simple and efficient variant of covari-
ance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-ES) [10],
which is the (1+1)-CMA-ES [14]. In each update iteration
of the (1+1)-CMA-ES, a new offspring (candidate solution)
is generated from its parent (current solution) by adding a
random noise, the objective of these two solutions are eval-
uated, and the better one is selected for the next iteration.
This method is capable for solving black-box optimization
problems. However, directly applying the (1+1)-CMA-ES
to optimize Eq. (2) is inefficient due to the high dimension
of x∗. Considering the query limit in decision-based black-
box attacks for face images, the original (1+1)-CMA-ES
may be infeasible. To accelerate this algorithm, we design
an appropriate distribution to sample the random noise in
each iteration, which can model the local geometries of the
search directions. We also propose several techniques to re-
duce the dimension of the search space by considering the
special characteristics of this problem.
The overall evolutionary attack algorithm is outlined in
Algorithm 1. Rather than the original n-dimensional input
3
Algorithm 1 The evolutionary attack algorithm
Input: The attack objective function L(x∗); the original face im-
age x; the dimension n ∈ N+ of the input space (x∗ ∈ Rn);
the dimension m ∈ N+ of the search space; the number of
coordinates k ∈ N+ for stochastic coordinate selection.
Input: The total number of queries T .
1: Initialize C = Im, pc = 0, σ, µ, cc, ccov ∈ R+, x˜∗ ∈ Rn;
2: for t = 1 to T do
3: Sample z ∼ N (0, σ2C);
4: Select k coordinates fromm with probability proportional
to each diagonal element in C;
5: Set the non-selected coordinates of z to 0;
6: Upscale z to Rn by bilinear interpolation and obtain z˜;
7: z˜ ← z˜ + µ(x− x˜∗);
8: if L(x˜∗ + z˜) < L(x˜∗) then
9: x˜∗ ← x˜∗ + z˜;
10: Update pc andC by z according to Eq. (3) and Eq. (4);
11: end if
12: end for
13: return x˜∗.
space, we perform search in a lower dimensional space Rm
with m < n. In each iteration, we first sample a random
vector z from N (0, σ2C) such that z ∈ Rm, where C is
a diagonal covariance matrix to model the local geometries
of the search directions. We then select k coordinates ran-
domly for search, according to the assumption that only a
fraction of pixels are important for finding an adversarial
image. We keep the value of the selected k coordinates of z
by setting the others to 0. We upscale z to the input space
by bilinear interpolation and get z˜ ∈ Rn. We further add a
bias to z˜ to minimize the distance between the adversarial
and original images. We finally test whether we get a better
solution. If we indeed find a better solution, we jump to it
and update the covariance matrix. In the following, we will
give a detailed description of each step in the algorithm.
3.2.1 Initialization
In Algorithm 1, x˜∗ should be initialized at first (in Step 1).
If the initial x˜∗ does not satisfy the adversarial criterion,
L(x˜∗) equals to +∞. For subsequent iterations, adding a
random vector can rarely make the search point adversar-
ial due to that deep CNNs are generally robust to random
noises [34], and thus the loss function will keep being +∞.
So we initialize x˜∗ with a sample that already satisfies the
adversarial criterion. The following updates will also keep
x˜∗ adversarial, and at the same time minimize the distance
between x˜∗ and x. For dodging attack, the initial x˜∗ can
be simply set as a random vector. For impersonation attack,
we use the target image as the initial point of x˜∗.
3.2.2 Mean of Gaussian Distribution
We explain why we need to add a bias term to the random
vector in Step 7. Assume now that the dimension of the
search space is the same as that of the input space and we
select all coordinates for search (i.e., k = m = n). In each
iteration, a random vector z is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution. In general, the distribution should be unbiased
(with zero mean) for better exploration in the search space.
But in our problem, sampling the random vector from a zero
mean Gaussian distribution will result in nearly zero proba-
bility of updates as n→∞, given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (Proof in Appendix A) Assume that the covari-
ance matrixC is positive definite. Let λmax and λmin(> 0)
be the largest and smallest eigenvalues of C, respectively.
Then, we have
Pz∼N (0,σ2C)
(L(x˜∗ + z) < L(x˜∗)) ≤ 4λmax‖x˜∗ − x‖2
σ2λ2minn
2
.
From Theorem 1, we need to draw O(n2) samples from
the zero mean Gaussian distribution for only one success-
ful update, which is inefficient and costly when n is large.
This happens because in high dimensional search space, a
randomly drawn vector z is almost orthogonal to x˜∗ − x,
thus the distance D(x˜∗ + z,x) will be rarely smaller than
D(x˜∗,x). To address this problem, the random vector z
should be sampled from a biased distribution towards min-
imizing the distance of x˜∗ from the original image x. So
we add a bias term µ(x − x˜∗) to z˜ (the same as z when
k = m = n) in Step 7, where µ is a critical hyper-parameter
controlling the strength of going towards the original image
x. We will specify the update procedure of µ in Sec. 3.2.6.
3.2.3 Covariance Matrix Adaptation
The adaptation of covariance matrix C is suitable for solv-
ing non-separable optimization problems since it can model
the local geometries of the search directions [10]. For ex-
ample, an appropriately set covariance matrix can make the
random vectors generated predominantly in the direction of
narrow valleys. In learning all pair-wise dependencies be-
tween dimensions, the storage and computation complexity
of the covariance matrix is at least O(m2), which is unac-
ceptable whenm is large. For black-box adversarial attacks,
the dimension of the search space is extremely large (e.g.,
m = 45× 45× 3 in our experiments). Therefore, we relax
the covariance matrix to be a diagonal matrix for efficient
computation. Inspired by [24] which uses a diagonal co-
variance matrix for CMA-ES, we design an update rule for
the adaptation of the diagonal covariance matrix C (in Step
10) after each successful trial as
pc = (1− cc)pc +
√
cc(2− cc)z
σ
, (3)
cii = (1− ccov)cii + ccov(pc)2i , (4)
where pc ∈ Rm is called the evolution path as it stores
the exponentially decayed successful search directions; for
i = 1, ...,m, cii is the diagonal element of C and (pc)i is
the i-th element of pc. cc and ccov are two hyper-parameters
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Model SphereFace [17] CosFace [37] ArcFace [5]
Queries 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000
Dodging
Boundary [1] 2.3e-2 9.3e-3 7.0e-4 1.9e-5 2.0e-2 7.5e-3 7.7e-4 1.6e-5 2.4e-2 1.6e-2 1.5e-3 2.3e-5
Optimization [4] 1.2e-2 2.9e-3 1.3e-3 7.1e-5 1.1e-2 2.9e-3 1.3e-3 6.6e-5 1.5e-2 5.4e-3 2.6e-3 9.9e-5
NES-LO [15] 1.4e-1 3.8e-2 2.4e-2 7.4e-3 1.4e-1 3.5e-2 2.0e-2 6.5e-3 1.4e-1 3.9e-2 2.3e-2 1.5e-2
Evolutionary 1.6e-3 8.9e-5 3.4e-5 1.3e-5 1.7e-3 9.1e-5 3.3e-5 1.1e-5 2.8e-3 1.5e-4 5.2e-5 1.6e-5
Impersonation
Boundary [1] 1.5e-2 6.3e-3 5.7e-4 1.6e-5 1.1e-2 2.9e-3 2.8e-4 7.4e-6 2.0e-2 9.2e-3 1.2e-3 1.7e-5
Optimization [4] 1.1e-2 3.3e-3 1.3e-3 6.1e-5 7.7e-3 1.9e-3 7.1e-4 2.8e-5 1.6e-2 7.0e-3 3.3e-3 7.7e-5
NES-LO [15] 8.4e-2 2.6e-2 1.7e-2 5.5e-3 9.3e-2 2.0e-2 1.2e-2 3.1e-3 9.3e-2 3.0e-2 1.9e-2 8.1e-3
Evolutionary 1.2e-3 7.2e-5 2.9e-5 1.2e-5 6.5e-4 3.7e-5 1.5e-5 5.3e-6 2.3e-3 1.2e-4 3.9e-5 1.2e-5
Table 1. The results on face verification conducted on the LFW dataset. We report the average distortions (MSEs) of the adversarial images
generated by different methods for SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace given 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 100,000 queries.
of CMA. An intuitive explanation of this update is that the
variance along the past successful directions should be en-
larged for future search.
3.2.4 Stochastic Coordinate Selection
For adversarial attacks, the perturbations added to the im-
ages could be very sparse to fool deep CNNs [30], indi-
cating that only a fraction of coordinates (pixels) are suf-
ficient for finding the adversarial images. We can also ac-
celerate the black-box optimization if we could identify the
important coordinates. However, this is non-trivial in the
decision-based black-box attack setting. Fortunately, our
algorithm provides a natural way to find the useful coor-
dinates for search since the elements in the diagonal co-
variance matrixC represent the preferred coordinates of the
past successful trials, i.e., larger cii indicates that searching
along the i-th coordinate may induce a higher success rate
based on the past experience. According to this, in each it-
eration we select k (k  m) coordinates to generate the
random vector z with the probability of selecting the i-th
coordinate being proportional to cii (in Step 4-5).
3.2.5 Dimensionality Reduction
It has been proved that the dimensionality reduction of
the search space is useful for acceleration of black-box at-
tacks [3]. Based on this, we sample the random vector z in
a lower dimensional space Rm with m < n (in Step 3). We
then adopt an upscaling operator to project z to the original
spaceRn (in Step 6). Note that we do not change the dimen-
sion of an input image but only reduce the dimension of the
search space. Specifically, we use the bilinear interpolation
method as the upscaling operator.
3.2.6 Hyper-parameter Adjustment
There are also several hyper-parameters in the proposed al-
gorithm, including σ, µ, cc, and ccov . We simply set cc =
0.01 and ccov = 0.001. σ is set as 0.01 · D(x˜∗,x) based
on the intuition that σ should shrink gradually when the dis-
tance from x decreases. µ is a critical hyper-parameter that
needs to be tuned carefully. If µ is too large, the search
point may probably violate the adversarial criterion and the
success rate of updates is low. On the other hand, if µ is too
small, we would make little progress towards minimizing
the distance between x˜∗ and x although the success rate is
high. So we adopt the 1/5th success rule [23], which is a
traditional method for hyper-parameter control in evolution
strategies, to update µ as µ = µ · exp(Psuccess− 1/5), where
Psuccess is the success rate of several past trials.
4. Experiments
In this section, we present the experimental results to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed evolutionary
attack method. We comprehensively evaluate the robustness
of several state-of-the-art face recognition models under the
decision-based black-box attack scenario. We further apply
the proposed method to attack a real-world face recognition
system to demonstrate its practical applicability.
4.1. Experimental Settings
Target models. We study three state-of-the-art face recog-
nition models, including SphereFace [17], CosFace [37] and
ArcFace [5]. In testing, the feature representation for each
image is first extracted by these models. Then, the cosine
similarity between feature representations of different im-
ages are calculated. Finally, we use the thresholding strat-
egy and nearest neighbor classifier for face verification and
identification, respectively.
Datasets. We conduct experiments on the Labeled Face in
the Wild (LFW) [12] and MegaFace [16] datasets. For face
verification, in each dataset, we select 500 pairs of face im-
ages for dodging attack, in which each pair represent the
same identity. And, we select another 500 pairs of face im-
ages for impersonation attack, in which the images of each
pair are from different identities. For face identification, in
each dataset, we select 500 images of 500 different identi-
ties to form a gallery set, and corresponding 500 images of
the same identities to form a probe set. We perform dodging
and impersonation attacks for images in the probe set. For
impersonation attack, the target identity is chosen randomly.
The input image size (i.e., the dimension of the input space
n) is 112×112×3. All the selected images can be correctly
recognized by the three face recognition models.
Compared methods. We compare the performance of the
evolutionary attack method with all existing methods for
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Model SphereFace [17] CosFace [37] ArcFace [5]
Queries 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000
Dodging
Boundary [1] 2.4e-2 6.5e-3 4.7e-4 1.4e-5 2.0e-2 5.1e-3 5.4e-4 1.2e-5 3.1e-2 1.7e-2 1.6e-3 2.3e-5
Optimization [4] 1.1e-2 2.1e-3 8.3e-4 4.6e-5 1.0e-2 2.0e-3 8.2e-4 4.0e-5 2.0e-2 6.1e-3 2.7e-3 9.8e-5
NES-LO [15] 1.4e-1 4.0e-2 2.5e-2 5.5e-3 1.5e-1 3.6e-2 2.2e-2 4.7e-3 1.5e-1 4.5e-2 3.1e-2 1.3e-2
Evolutionary 1.3e-3 6.6e-5 2.5e-5 9.9e-6 1.2e-3 6.2e-5 2.3e-5 7.5e-6 3.2e-3 1.6e-4 5.4e-5 1.6e-5
Impersonation
Boundary [1] 2.4e-2 1.1e-2 1.7e-3 3.6e-5 2.5e-2 8.9e-3 1.3e-3 2.3e-5 2.5e-2 1.3e-2 2.5e-3 3.8e-5
Optimization [4] 1.9e-2 7.7e-3 3.7e-3 1.6e-4 1.9e-2 7.1e-3 3.3e-3 1.1e-4 2.0e-2 1.1e-2 6.0e-3 3.5e-4
NES-LO [15] 7.9e-2 3.8e-2 2.8e-2 1.0e-2 8.8e-2 3.7e-2 2.7e-2 8.8e-3 8.8e-2 3.4e-2 2.3e-2 1.1e-2
Evolutionary 2.5e-3 1.6e-4 6.3e-5 2.3e-5 2.2e-3 1.3e-4 4.6e-5 1.5e-5 3.7e-3 2.5e-4 8.8e-5 2.6e-5
Table 2. The results on face identification conducted on the LFW dataset. We report the average distortions (MSEs) of the adversarial
images generated by different methods for SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace given 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 100,000 queries.
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Figure 2. The results on face verification conducted on the LFW
dataset. We show the curves of the average distortions (MSEs) of
the adversarial images generated by different attack methods for
SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace over the number of queries.
decision-based black-box attacks, including the boundary
attack method [1], optimization-based method [4] and an
extension of NES in the label-only setting (NES-LO) [15].
Evaluation metrics. For all methods, the generated ad-
versarial examples are guaranteed to be adversarial. So we
measure the distortion between the adversarial and original
images by mean square error (MSE) to evaluate the perfor-
mance of different methods1. We set a maximum number
of queries to be 100,000 for each image across all experi-
ments. Due to the space limitation, we leave the results on
the MegaFace dataset in Appendix B. The results on both
datasets are consistent. Our method is generally applicable
beyond face recognition. We further present the results on
1Images are normalized to [0, 1].
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Figure 3. The results on face identification conducted on the LFW
dataset. We show the curves of the average distortions (MSEs) of
the adversarial images generated by different attack methods for
SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace over the number of queries.
the ImageNet dataset in Appendix C.
4.2. Experimental Results
We report the results on the LFW dataset in this section.
We perform dodging attack and impersonation attack by
Boundary, Optimization, NES-LO, and the proposed Evolu-
tionary method against SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace,
respectively. For our method, we set the dimension of the
search space asm = 45×45×3, and k = m/20 for stochas-
tic coordinate selection. For other methods, we adopt the
default settings. We calculate the distortions (MSEs) of the
adversarial images generated by each method averaged over
the selected 500 images. And, the distortion curves over
the number of queries for face verification are shown in
Fig. 2, while those for face identification in Fig. 3. Besides,
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Figure 4. Examples of dodging and impersonation attacks on face verification for the ArcFace [5] model. The initial adversarial image is a
random noise or the target image for each kind of attacks. The distortion between the adversarial image and the original image decreases
gradually. We show the total number of queries and the mean square error until each point.
SphereFace CosFace ArcFace
wo/ CMA, wo/ SCS 2.6e-4/1.9e-4 2.5e-4/9.2e-5 4.2e-4/2.6e-4
w/ CMA, wo/ SCS 2.4e-4/1.8e-4 2.3e-4/8.5e-5 3.8e-4/2.5e-4
w/ CMA, w/ SCS (C) 1.7e-4/1.3e-4 1.6e-4/6.4e-5 2.6e-4/1.7e-4
w/ CMA, w/ SCS (In) 2.0e-4/1.5e-4 1.9e-4/7.5e-5 3.0e-4/2.0e-4
Table 3. Comparisons of the evolutionary method with four set-
tings: without CMA or SCS; with CMA, without SCS; with CMA
and SCS where the selection probability is proportional to the ele-
ments inC; with CMA and SCS where the selection probability is
set equally. We report the average distortions (MSEs) given 10,000
queries for dodging/impersonation attacks on face verification.
for 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 100,000 queries, we report
the corresponding distortion values of different methods for
face verification in Table 1, while those for face identifica-
tion in Table 2. Two visual examples are also presented in
Fig. 4 for dodging and impersonation attacks.
Above results demonstrate that our method converges
much faster and achieves smaller distortions compared with
other methods consistently across both tasks (i.e., face ver-
ification and identification), both attack settings (i.e., dodg-
ing and impersonation), and all face models. For example,
as shown in Table 1 and 2, given 5,000 queries our method
obtains the distortions which are about 30 times smaller
than those generated by the second best method (i.e., Opti-
mization), which validates the effectiveness of the proposed
method. From Fig. 4, it can be seen that 2,000 queries are
sufficient to generate visually indistinguishable adversarial
examples. For NES-LO, the hard-label predictions are first
used to estimate the predicted probability (e.g., 25 queries)
and then it approximates the gradient by NES (e.g., 40 tri-
als). In consequence, this method requires more than 1,000
queries for only one update, which leads to the worst results.
It should be noted that the face recognition models are
extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples. These mod-
els can be fooled in the black-box manner by adversarial
examples with about only 1e−5 distortions, which are visu-
ally imperceptible for humans, as shown in Fig. 4.
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Figure 5. We show the curves of the average distortions (MSEs)
of the adversarial images generated by the evolutionary method
with different dimensions of the search space over the number of
queries. We perform dodging and impersonation attacks against
SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace on face verification.
4.3. Ablation Study
We perform ablation study in this section to validate the
effectiveness of each component in the proposed method.
We conduct experiments based on face verification on the
LFW dataset. In particular, we study the effects of covari-
ance matrix adaptation, stochastic coordinate selection and
dimensionality reduction respectively.
Covariance matrix adaptation (CMA). To examine the
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usefulness of CMA, we compare CMA with a baseline
method that the covariance matrix is set to In without up-
dating. We do not include stochastic coordinate selection
or dimensionality reduction in this part for solely examin-
ing the effect of CMA. We show the results of the average
distortions given 10,000 queries in the first two rows of Ta-
ble 3. CMA improves the results over the baseline method.
Stochastic coordinate selection (SCS). We study two
aspects of SCS. The first is whether SCS is useful. The sec-
ond is whether we should select the coordinates with prob-
ability being proportional to the diagonal elements in the
covariance matrix C. We further perform experiments with
SCS, where we compare the performance of SCS with the
selection probability of each coordinate being proportional
to each diagonal element in C or In (equal probability for
each coordinate). By comparing the 2-4 rows of Table 3, it
can be seen that SCS is beneficial for obtaining better results
and sampling coordinates with probability proportional to
cii is better than sampling with equal probability.
Dimensionality reduction. We finally study the influ-
ence of dimensionality reduction. We set the dimension m
of the search space as 15×15×3, 30×30×3, 45×45×3,
60×60×3, and 112×112×3. We perform dodging and im-
personation attacks against SphereFace, CosFace, and Arc-
Face with each m, and compare the results in Fig. 5. It can
be seen that the evolutionary method converges faster in a
lower dimensional search space. However, if the dimension
of the search space is too small (e.g., 15 × 15 × 3), the at-
tack results in relatively large distortions. So we choose a
medium dimension as 45×45×3 in the above experiments.
4.4. Attacks on a Real-World Application
In this section, we apply the evolutionary attack method
to the face verification API in Tencent AI Open Platform2.
This face verification API allows users to upload two face
images, and outputs a similarity score of them. We set the
threshold to be 90, i.e., if the similarity score is larger than
90, the two images are predicted to be the same identity;
and if not, they are predicted to be different identities.
We choose 10 pairs of images from the LFW dataset to
perform impersonation attack. The original two face images
of each pair are from different identities. We generate a per-
turbation for one of them and make the API recognize the
adversarial image to be the same identity as the other im-
age. We set the maximum number of queries to be 10,000.
We use the proposed evolutionary method to attack the face
verification API and compare the results with Boundary [1]
and Optimization [4]. We do not present the result of NES-
LO [15], as it fails to generate an adversarial image within
10,000 queries. We show the average distortion between the
adversarial and original images in Table 4. Our method still
obtains a smaller distortion than other baseline methods.
2https://ai.qq.com/product/face.shtml#compare
Attack Method Distortion (MSE)
Boundary [1] 1.63e-2
Optimization [4] 1.71e-2
Evolutionary 2.54e-3
Table 4. The results of impersonation attack on the real-world face
verification API. We report the average distortions (MSEs) of the
selected 10 pairs of images by different attack methods.
Evolutionary Boundary OptimizationOriginal pair
Figure 6. Examples of impersonation attack on the real-world face
verification API. We show the original pairs of images as well as
the adversarial images generated by each method.
We also show two examples in Fig. 6. It can be seen that
the adversarial images generated by our method are more
visually similar to the original images, while those gener-
ated by other methods have large distortions, making them
distinguishable from the original images.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an evolutionary attack method
to generate adversarial examples in the decision-based
black-box setting. Our method improves the efficiency over
the other methods by modeling the local geometries of the
search directions and meanwhile reducing the dimension of
the search space. We applied the proposed method to com-
prehensively study the robustness of several state-of-the-art
face recognition models, and compared against the other
methods. The extensive experiments consistently demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We showed
that the existing face recognition models are extremely
vulnerable to adversarial attacks in the black-box manner,
which raises security concerns for developing more robust
face recognition models. We finally attacked a real-world
face recognition system by the proposed method, demon-
strating its practical applicability.
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Appendix
A. Proof
Theorem 1. Assume that the covariance matrix C is pos-
itive definite. Let λmax and λmin(> 0) be the largest and
smallest eigenvalues of C, respectively. Then, we have
Pz∼N (0,σ2C)
(L(x˜∗ + z) < L(x˜∗)) ≤ 4λmax‖x˜∗ − x‖2
σ2λ2minn
2
.
Proof. Assume that the eigenvalues of the covariance ma-
trix C are λ1, λ2, ..., λn. Let λmax and λmin be the largest
and smallest eigenvalues, respectively. If C is positive def-
inite, we have λmin > 0. Since the covariance matrix
C is a symmetric matrix, we can decompose C by eigen-
decomposition as
C = (AB) · (AB)T ,
whereA is an orthogonal matrix andB is a diagonal matrix
whose i-th element bii =
√
λi.
We assume that z′ ∼ N (0, I), and z = σABz′ such
that z ∼ N (0, σ2C). We can then calculate the probability
as
Pz∼N (0,σ2C)
(L(x˜∗ + z) < L(x˜∗))
≤Pz′∼N (0,I)
(‖x˜∗ + σABz′ − x)‖ < ‖x˜∗ − x‖)
=Pz′∼N (0,I)
(
(x˜∗ − x) · (σABz′) < −1
2
σ2‖ABz′‖2)
≤Pz′∼N (0,I)
(
(x˜∗ − x) · (ABz′) < −1
2
σλmin‖z′‖2
)
.
According to the law of large number [19], we have
‖z′‖2 a.s.−→ n when n→∞.
We then calculate the mean and variance of the random vari-
able y = (x˜∗ − x) · (ABz′)
E(y) = E
[
(x˜∗ − x) · (ABz′)] = 0.
Var(y) =
∫
z′∼N (0,I)
|(x˜∗ − x) · (ABz′)|2dz′
≤ λmax
∫
z′∼N (0,I)
|(x˜∗ − x) · z′|2dz′
= λmax‖x˜∗ − x‖2.
Finally, according to the Chebyshev’s inequality [13], we
have
Pz∼N (0,σ2C)
(L(x˜∗ + z) < L(x˜∗))
≤Pz′∼N (0,I)
(
(x˜∗ − x) · (ABz′) < −1
2
σλmin‖z′‖2
)
=Pz′∼N (0,I)
(
y < −1
2
σλminn
)
≤Pz′∼N (0,I)
(|y| > 1
2
σλminn
)
≤ Var(y)
( 12σλminn)
2
≤4λmax‖x˜
∗ − x‖2
σ2λ2minn
2
.
B. Results on MegeFace
We supplement the results on the MegaFace dataset [16].
We attack SphereFace [17], CosFace [37], and ArcFace [5]
by Boundary [1], Optimization [4], NES-LO [15], and the
proposed Evolutionary for face verification and identifica-
tion, respectively. We show the distortion curves over the
number of queries in Fig. 7 for face verification, and Fig. 8
for face identification, respectively. We also report the dis-
tortion values of different methods at 1,000, 5,000, 10,000,
and 100,000 queries in Table 5 for face verification, and
Table 6 for face identification, respectively. The proposed
method outperforms the other methods in all settings on the
MegaFace dataset. The results are consistent with those
based on the LFW dataset.
C. Results on ImageNet
It should be noted that the proposed evolutionary attack
method is not restricted to attacking face recognition mod-
els. It could be used to perform decision-based black-box
attacks for any image classification tasks. In this section,
we conduct additional experiments to demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of the evolutionary attack method in the general
object recognition task based on the ImageNet [25] dataset.
We use the Inception v3 [33] and ResNet 50 [11] networks
in our experiments. We choose 100 images from the Ima-
geNet validation set, which are correctly classified by these
two models. We perform untargeted attack and targeted at-
tack against each model by Boundary, Optimization, NES-
LO, and Evolutionary in the decision-based black-box set-
ting. We show the results in Fig. 9 and Table 7. The experi-
mental results consistently demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed method.
D. Experiments Requested by the Reviewers
We provide the experimental results requested by the re-
viewers during the review process.
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Model SphereFace [17] CosFace [37] ArcFace [5]
Queries 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000
Dodging
Boundary [1] 2.5e-2 8.8e-3 8.3e-4 2.4e-5 2.0e-2 7.2e-3 9.0e-4 1.9e-5 2.5e-2 1.7e-2 1.6e-3 2.5e-5
Optimization [4] 1.3e-2 2.9e-3 1.4e-3 8.9e-5 1.1e-2 3.0e-3 1.4e-3 8.7e-5 1.7e-2 5.3e-3 2.4e-3 1.0e-4
NES-LO [15] 1.5e-1 4.2e-2 2.7e-2 6.9e-3 1.4e-1 3.8e-2 2.3e-2 6.5e-3 1.4e-1 4.2e-2 2.7e-2 1.8e-2
Evolutionary 1.7e-3 1.0e-4 4.1e-5 1.6e-5 1.7e-3 1.0e-4 3.9e-5 1.3e-5 2.6e-3 1.6e-4 5.4e-5 1.8e-5
Impersonation
Boundary [1] 1.8e-2 8.4e-3 7.9e-4 2.3e-5 1.1e-2 3.9e-3 3.6e-4 1.1e-5 1.7e-2 9.9e-3 1.5e-3 2.2e-5
Optimization [4] 1.4e-2 4.6e-3 1.9e-3 8.5e-5 7.7e-3 2.3e-3 8.9e-4 4.0e-5 1.4e-2 6.7e-3 3.5e-3 9.6e-5
NES-LO [15] 9.2e-2 3.0e-2 2.1e-2 7.7e-3 7.9e-2 2.2e-2 1.4e-2 4.7e-3 7.9e-2 2.9e-2 1.9e-2 9.3e-3
Evolutionary 1.5e-3 9.5e-5 3.9e-5 1.6e-5 8.2e-4 4.9e-5 2.0e-5 7.6e-6 2.7e-3 1.6e-4 4.9e-5 1.6e-5
Table 5. The results on face verification conducted on the MegaFace dataset. We report the average distortion (MSE) of the adversarial
images generated by different methods for SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace given 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 100,000 queries.
Model SphereFace [17] CosFace [37] ArcFace [5]
Queries 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000
Dodging
Boundary [1] 3.9e-2 1.1e-2 1.0e-3 2.7e-5 2.8e-2 7.6e-3 7.9e-4 1.9e-5 3.8e-2 2.4e-2 2.3e-3 3.5e-5
Optimization [4] 2.0e-2 4.2e-3 1.7e-3 9.4e-5 1.4e-2 3.0e-3 1.3e-3 6.9e-5 2.6e-2 8.0e-3 3.6e-3 1.4e-4
NES-LO [15] 1.5e-1 5.3e-2 3.7e-2 9.3e-3 1.4e-1 4.7e-2 3.3e-2 7.7e-3 1.4e-1 5.5e-2 4.1e-2 1.7e-2
Evolutionary 2.3e-3 1.3e-4 4.8e-5 1.8e-5 1.7e-3 9.3e-5 3.5e-5 1.2e-5 3.6e-3 1.9e-4 6.7e-5 2.2e-5
Impersonation
Boundary [1] 2.4e-2 1.1e-2 1.5e-3 3.8e-5 2.0e-2 7.1e-3 1.0e-3 2.5e-5 2.0e-2 1.3e-2 2.4e-3 4.6e-5
Optimization [4] 1.7e-2 6.1e-3 2.9e-3 1.5e-4 1.4e-2 4.7e-3 2.1e-3 1.1e-4 1.6e-2 8.4e-3 4.5e-3 2.3e-4
NES-LO [15] 8.8e-2 3.6e-2 2.6e-2 1.0e-2 7.5e-2 3.2e-2 2.3e-2 8.2e-3 7.5e-2 3.3e-2 2.4e-2 1.2e-2
Evolutionary 2.4e-3 1.7e-4 6.7e-5 2.6e-5 1.8e-3 1.3e-4 5.0e-5 1.7e-5 3.4e-3 2.7e-4 1.0e-4 3.2e-5
Table 6. The results on face identification conducted on the MegaFace dataset. We report the average distortion (MSE) of the adversarial
images generated by different methods for SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace given 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 100,000 queries.
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Figure 7. The results on face verification conducted on the
MegaFace dataset. We show the curves of the average distor-
tion (MSE) of the adversarial images generated by different attack
methods for SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace over the number
of queries.
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Figure 8. The results on face identification conducted on the
MegaFace dataset. We show the curves of the average distor-
tion (MSE) of the adversarial images generated by different attack
methods for SphereFace, CosFace, and ArcFace over the number
of queries.
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Figure 9. The results of untargeted and targeted attacks on the ImageNet dataset. We show the curves of the average distortion (MSE) of
the adversarial images generated by different attack methods for the Inception v3 and ResNet 50 networks over the number of queries.
Model Inception v3 [33] ResNet 50 [11]
Queries 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 5,000 10,000 100,000
Untargeted
Boundary [1] 4.0e-2 1.8e-2 4.2e-3 1.9e-5 4.1e-2 2.1e-2 4.6e-3 3.2e-5
Optimization [4] 2.8e-2 1.2e-2 7.3e-3 3.2e-4 2.9e-2 1.3e-2 7.7e-3 3.8e-4
NES-LO [15] 1.5e-1 6.2e-2 4.7e-2 1.8e-2 1.5e-1 5.9e-2 4.4e-2 1.9e-2
Evolutionary 5.3e-3 4.2e-4 1.0e-4 4.5e-6 6.6e-3 6.3e-4 1.8e-4 7.4e-6
Targeted
Boundary [1] 3.7e-2 2.2e-2 1.0e-2 1.8e-4 3.9e-2 2.5e-2 1.3e-2 2.3e-4
Optimization [4] 3.4e-2 2.3e-2 1.8e-2 2.7e-3 3.6e-2 2.5e-2 2.0e-2 4.6e-3
NES-LO [15] 1.3e-1 6.6e-2 5.2e-2 2.4e-2 1.3e-1 6.7e-2 5.4e-2 2.7e-2
Evolutionary 1.4e-2 2.7e-3 9.9e-4 9.0e-6 1.6e-2 3.2e-3 1.1e-3 2.7e-5
Table 7. The results of untargeted and targeted attacks on the ImageNet dataset. We report the average distortion (MSE) of the adversarial
images generated by different methods for the Inception v3 and ResNet 50 networks given 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 100,000 queries.
D.1. Standard Deviation of the Distortion
We provide the mean, standard deviation, and maximum
of the distortion (MSE) over the 500 pairs of images of
LFW in Table 8. The results are based on our method for
face verification given 100,000 queries. Some adversarial
images have larger distortions. But the maximum distor-
tions are smaller than 1.1e−4, which is almost impercepti-
ble for humans (see the examples in Fig. 4).
D.2. A different Initial Image for Impersonation
Attacks
In impersonation attacks, we use the original target im-
age (enrollment image) as the initialization. We agree that
using a different image of the target identity is more prac-
mean std max
SphereFace [17] Dodging 1.3e-5 1.2e-5 9.4e-5Impersonation 1.2e-5 8.1e-6 6.2e-5
CosFace [37] Dodging 1.1e-5 9.4e-6 5.2e-5Impersonation 5.3e-6 4.3e-6 2.4e-5
ArcFace [5] Dodging 1.6e-5 1.2e-5 7.2e-5Impersonation 1.2e-5 9.2e-6 1.1e-4
Table 8. The mean, standard deviation, and maximum of the dis-
tortion (MSE) over the 500 pairs of images based on the LFW
dataset.
tical than using the enrollment image. However, when we
are given an image of the target identity, our method could
be always used to find a minimum perturbation, no matter
whether the initial image is the enrollment image or a dif-
ferent image. To verify this, we use a different image of
the target identity as the initial image to perform imperson-
ation attacks on face verification. The average distortions
after 100,000 queries are 1.1e−5, 4.7e−6, and 1.1e−5 for
the three models, which are very similar to 1.2e−5, 5.3e−6,
and 1.2e−5 shown in Table 1, where the initial image is the
enrollment image.
D.3. Compared with White-box Attacks
We attack the CosFace model by the white-box attack
method PGD [20] for face verification. For each pair of
face images, we find a minimum perturbation that leads to
misclassification by binary search. The average distortions
over the 500 pairs are 1.7e−5 for dodging attack, and 8.0e−6
for impersonation attack, which are larger than the average
distortions given by our method (1.1e−5 and 5.3e−6 shown
in Table 1).
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